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This paper uses data on companies that have been in the S&P 500 index
since 1957 to examine whether risk aversion has decreased since 1995. The
evidence suggests that it has not. There is no evidence that more risky com-
panies have had larger increases in their price-earnings ratios since 1995 than
less risky companies.
1 Introduction
It is clear that there has been a huge increase in the average price-earnings (PE)
ratio of U.S. stocks since 1995. For example, the median S&P 500 PE ratio for
1996–2000 is 26.41, which compares to the median of 15.45 for 1957–1994.1
Earnings fell on average more than stock prices in 2001, and the S&P 500 PE ratio
∗Cowles Foundation and International Center for Finance, Yale University, New Haven, CT
06520-8281. Voice: 203-432-3715; Fax: 203-432-6167; email: ray.fair@yale.edu; website:
http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu. I am indebted to John Cochrane and Jesse Shapiro for helpful
comments and to Alisa Levine for superb research assistance.
1As discussed in Section 4, medians seem more appropriate than means as measures of average
PE ratios. For the S&P 500 PE ratio, however, medians and means are close. For 1996–2000 the
mean is 26.61 (versus 26.41), and for 1957–1994 the mean is 15.02 (versus 15.45). For 1985–1994
the median is 15.45 and the mean is 17.33, both still much lower than the median and mean for
1996–2000. Note that 1995 is not used in these calculations; it is treated as a transition year. The
S&P 500 PE ratio is defined as the value of the S&P 500 stock price index at the end of the year
divided by S&P 500 reported earnings for that year.
for 2001 is 46.50! The PE ratio for 2002 is 31.08. The ratios for 2001 and 2002
are obviously high because earnings are unusually low, but they are much higher
than existed in previous low-earnings periods. For example, earnings were low in
1991, and the PE ratio for 1991 is 26.22.
There was, on the other hand, no corresponding large decrease in real long term
interest rates after 1995. The median real AAA bond rate2 for 1996–2000 is .053,
which compares to the median of .031 for 1957–1994 and .057 for 1985–1994.
(The respective means are .054, .037, and .059.)
Why PE ratios have risen so much since 1995 with little change in real long
term interest rates is a key question in finance. Does this signal the end of the
equity premium puzzle, about which so much has been written?3 The possibility
that is examined in this paper is that the degree of risk aversion of the average
investor fell in the last half of the 1990s. This could account at least in part for
the increase in PE ratios relative to real long term interest rates. The paper uses
data on companies that have been in the S&P 500 index since 1957, which is the
first year that the S&P index included 500 companies. The data are discussed in
Section 2, and the 65 companies that were used are listed in Tables 1 and 2.
The basic idea of the paper is the following. Although the 65 companies are
obviously solid established companies, they do differ somewhat in risk. The first
step (Section 3) is to estimate the risk of each company using data from 1957
2The real AAA bond rate used for these calculations is the nominal AAA bond rate minus the
percentage change in the GDP deflator over the previous two years (at an annual rate).
3See Kocherlakota (1996) and Siegel and Thaler (1997) for reviews of the literature on the
equity premium puzzle prior to the possible change in the premium in the last half of the 1990s. For
more recent discussions of a possibly falling equity premium, see Siegel (1999) and Jagannathan,
McGrattan, and Scherbina (2000). For an interesting set of results on the views of financial
economists on the equity premium, see Welch (2000).
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through 1994. Two measures of risk are computed per company. The first is the
estimate ofβ from the CAPM model, and the second is a measure of the variability
of real earnings growth. The second step (Section 4) is to compute the change in
each company’s average PE ratio for the period before 1995 to the period after
1995. Once this is done, one can compare the changes in the average PE ratios
across companies. If the degree of risk aversion of the average investor fell after
1995, one should expect the changes in the average PE ratios for the more risky
companies to be on average larger than the changes for the less risky companies.4
The results in Section 5 show that this is not the case. There is no evidence from
these results that risk aversion has fallen. Other explanations are needed for the
large increase in PE ratios since 1995.
An advantage of using companies that have been in the S&P 500 index for a
long time (in addition to data availability) is that these companies are less likely
than others to have changed in large ways since 1995. The hypothesis tested in
this paper is that the degree of risk aversion of investors has changed since 1995,
not the inherent riskiness of companies. If the riskiness of the companies has also
changed, any differences found after 1995 might be due to these changes rather
than to changes in investors’ risk aversion. Note that survival bias is not a problem
here. In fact, long run survival is good here because this makes it more likely that
the risk characteristics of the firm have not changed. There would be selection
bias if firms were selected on the basis of how much their PE ratios changed since
1995, but this is not the case.
4A proof of the proposition that PE ratios increase more for more risky companies when risk
aversion falls is presented in the appendix for a particular model.
3
A number of people have suggested that at least some of the increase in PE
ratios since 1995 may be due to a fall in risk aversion. Shiller (2000, p. 41) suggests
that the rise of gambling opportunities may have led to “changed attitudes toward
risk taking in other areas.” Campbell and Cochrane (1999) have a model in which
risk aversion is lower in expansions than in recessions. Since the period between
1995 and 2000 was one of robust growth, this model implies lower risk aversion
in this period than otherwise.
Glassman and Hassett (1999, p. 97) argue that in the last half of the 1990s
people have been lowering their estimates of the overall riskiness of stocks relative
to bonds, which has driven up the price of stocks. While this is not necessarily
a change in risk aversion, it is a change that this paper tests. If there has been a
decrease in investors’estimates of the overall riskiness of stocks (and not, say, also
a decrease in risk aversion), it still should be the case that more risky companies
have larger increases in their PE ratios than less risky ones.
2 Data on the 65 Companies
A number of companies have been in the S&P 500 index since the inception of the
500-company index in 1957. For this paper 65 companies were chosen. These are
companies for which data existed back to (or nearly back to) 1957 and which were
not affected by large mergers. The 65 companies are listed in Tables 1 and 2 along
with various variables for each company. The variables are explained as the paper
proceeds. The companies are ranked in the tables by the size of theirβ ’s, which
are estimated in the next section.
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SEβi tαi APi endi begi
1 Alcan Inc. 0.466 0.235 0.42 0.74 0.750 0.778
2 TXU Corp. 0.545 0.109 0.21 1.19 0.393 0.370
3 Procter & Gamble Co. 0.597 0.196 1.71 0.33 0.821 0.000
4 PG&E Corp. 0.651 0.141 0.70 0.10 0.286 0.556
5 Phillips Petroleum Co. 0.678 0.211 1.00 0.13 0.714 1.000
6 AT&T Corp. 0.697 0.198 -0.14 0.16 0.321 0.630
7 Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co. 0.781 0.171 0.74 0.22 1.000 0.000
8 Alcoa Inc. 0.795 0.201 -0.26 0.31 0.786 0.259
9 American Electric Power 0.836 0.125 -0.23 0.60 0.964 0.444
10 Public Service Entrp 0.845 0.155 0.45 0.59 1.000 0.407
11 Hercules Inc. 0.851 0.223 0.67 0.04 0.000 0.889
12 Air Products & Chemicals I 0.865 0.226 1.39 0.14 0.679 0.000
13 Bristol Myers Squibb 0.866 0.206 2.46 0.30 0.393 0.000
14 Kimberly-Clark Corp. 0.869 0.161 1.21 0.11 0.821 0.074
15 Aetna Inc. 0.894 0.210 0.13 0.40 0.692 0.440
16 Wrigley (WM) Jr Co. 0.898 0.216 2.05 2.41 0.357 0.852
17 Halliburton Co. 0.906 0.297 0.80 0.06 0.536 0.926
18 Deere & Co. 0.916 0.269 1.02 0.11 0.179 0.630
19 Kroger Co. 0.931 0.257 1.34 0.25 0.571 1.000
20 Intl Business Machines Corp 0.944 0.248 0.38 3.93 0.000 0.333
21 Caterpillar Inc. 0.952 0.231 0.57 1.96 0.000 1.000
22 Goodrich Corp. 0.958 0.181 -1.39 0.21 0.786 0.111
23 General Mills Inc. 0.965 0.171 1.75 0.37 0.143 0.926
24 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc. 0.973 0.237 1.12 0.14 0.000 0.333
25 Heinz (H J) Co. 0.979 0.207 2.32 0.06 0.964 0.000
26 Eastman Kodak Co. 0.983 0.232 0.28 0.87 0.750 0.481
27 Campbell Soup Co. 0.986 0.199 1.17 1.56 0.929 0.370
28 Philip Morris Cos Inc. 0.993 0.233 3.30 0.09 0.393 0.630
29 Southern Co. 0.995 0.155 0.27 0.70 0.964 0.667
30 Du Pont (E I) de Nemours 0.996 0.143 -1.03 0.13 0.964 0.222
31 Phelps Dodge Corp. 1.008 0.294 0.51 0.02 0.286 1.000
32 Pfizer Inc. 1.019 0.244 1.27 0.29 0.000 0.259
33 Hershey Foods Corp. 1.022 0.232 1.31 0.41 1.000 0.370
34 Ingersoll-Rand Co. 1.024 0.226 0.04 0.54 0.607 1.000
35 FPL Group Inc. 1.048 0.137 -0.11 1.05 0.964 0.556
36 Pitney Bowes Inc. 1.064 0.295 1.18 0.59 0.857 0.593
37 Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. 1.073 0.348 1.56 1.21 0.393 0.778
38 Rockwell Intl Corp. 1.075 0.220 0.90 0.28 0.643 0.519
39 Dow Chemical 1.081 0.215 0.48 0.12 0.750 0.667
40 General Electric Co. 1.091 0.140 0.26 1.17 0.786 0.185
41 Abbott Laboratories 1.097 0.194 2.24 0.89 0.179 0.815
42 Merck & Co. 1.122 0.236 1.66 0.24 0.036 0.630
43 Penney (J C) Co. 1.133 0.206 0.55 0.03 0.214 1.000
44 Union Pacific Corp. 1.136 0.266 0.63 2.68 0.783 0.818
45 Schering-Plough 1.137 0.229 1.60 1.26 1.000 0.556
46 Pepsico Inc. 1.147 0.195 2.06 0.27 0.643 0.444
47 McGraw-Hill Companies 1.150 0.275 0.86 0.50 1.000 0.185
48 Household International Inc 1.184 0.222 0.29 0.03 0.304 0.591
49 Emerson Electric Co. 1.196 0.209 1.99 3.19 1.000 0.000
50 General Motors Corp. 1.206 0.233 -0.16 2.22 0.000 0.963
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SEβi tαi APi endi begi
51 Colgate-Palmolive Co. 1.213 0.201 1.39 7.98 0.857 0.000
52 Eaton Corp. 1.216 0.189 1.06 0.46 0.964 0.148
53 Dana Corp. 1.222 0.295 0.80 4.03 0.250 0.778
54 Sears Roebuck & Co. 1.256 0.213 -0.05 0.81 0.464 0.667
55 Corning Inc. 1.258 0.232 -0.29 1.22 0.464 0.444
56 General Dynamics Corp. 1.285 0.386 0.43 1.81 0.000 0.481
57 Coca-Cola Co. 1.290 0.223 2.35 0.07 0.321 0.074
58 Boeing Co. 1.306 0.427 1.34 0.09 1.000 0.630
59 Ford Motor Co. 1.308 0.337 1.09 0.18 0.321 0.185
60 Peoples Energy Corp. 1.454 0.402 0.47 0.43 1.000 0.000
61 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 1.464 0.347 0.11 0.47 0.000 1.000
62 May Department Stores Co. 1.525 0.257 0.62 0.23 0.893 1.000
63 ITT Industries Inc. 1.630 0.197 0.03 1.43 0.893 0.148
64 Raytheon Co. 1.821 0.375 0.69 0.90 0.857 0.000




= estimate ofβ from Section 3 (1958–1994 estimation period).
SEβi = estimated standard error ofβ
a
i
tαi = t-statistic for estimate of the constant term.
APi = Andrews-Ploberger statistic.
p-val endi = p-value for end-of-sample test.
p-val begi = p-value for beginning-of-sample test.
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1 Alcan Inc. 0.466 12.64 15.83 0.169 0.178 -0.013 -0.014 12.72 1.588 12.72
2 TXU Corp. 0.545 10.80 12.92 0.016 -0.036 0.014 0.029 10.79 0.096 10.72
3 Procter & Gamble Co. 0.597 19.90 32.78 0.066 0.112 0.050 0.109 24.37 0.173 23.56
4 PG&E Corp. 0.651 11.30 17.32 0.021 -0.426 0.014 -0.021 7.05 0.147 7.30
5 Phillips Petroleum Co. 0.678 13.27 13.36 0.071 0.172 0.006 0.003 14.29 0.523 14.27
6 AT&T Corp. 0.697 13.71 21.10 -0.004 -0.236 -0.008 -0.019 10.94 0.179 11.09
7 Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co. 0.781 17.61 22.74 0.054 0.381 0.051 0.014 20.92 0.196 21.11
8 Alcoa Inc. 0.795 15.97 18.41 0.120 0.162 -0.015 0.217 31.66 1.265 27.84
9 American Electric Power 0.836 10.68 16.75 -0.001 -0.056 -0.021 -0.019 10.24 0.194 10.25
10 Public Service Entrp 0.845 9.63 13.70 -0.018 -0.062 -0.011 -0.019 9.09 0.213 9.14
11 Hercules Inc. 0.851 16.07 17.10 0.077 0.018 -0.008 0.066 18.82 1.001 18.11
12 Air Products & Chemicals I 0.865 16.20 18.53 0.051 0.026 0.074 0.054 15.02 0.233 15.20
13 Bristol Myers Squibb 0.866 17.01 30.57 0.068 0.119 0.110 0.116 18.06 0.131 17.97
14 Kimberly-Clark Corp. 0.869 13.42 21.16 0.063 0.220 0.018 0.024 15.57 0.232 15.43
15 Aetna Inc. 0.894 8.98 14.30 -0.137 -0.042 0.007 -0.021 8.99 1.029 9.10
16 Wrigley (WM) Jr Co. 0.898 14.49 33.04 0.062 0.068 0.044 0.042 14.49 0.208 14.50
17 Halliburton Co. 0.906 17.84 32.08 0.120 0.542 -0.011 -0.019 24.88 0.688 24.63
18 Deere & Co. 0.916 12.15 15.41 -0.010 0.137 0.004 -0.014 13.06 1.077 13.12
19 Kroger Co. 0.931 11.82 24.84 0.010 0.036 0.000 0.000 12.07 0.743 12.06
20 Intl Business Machines Corp 0.944 16.08 18.56 0.081 0.184 0.045 0.096 20.23 0.282 19.60
21 Caterpillar Inc. 0.952 16.95 11.03 -0.043 0.119 -0.005 0.177 32.36 1.137 29.12
22 Goodrich Corp. 0.958 12.06 14.41 0.028 0.208 -0.015 -0.019 13.87 2.555 13.82
23 General Mills Inc. 0.965 17.16 22.42 0.060 0.043 0.048 0.006 15.05 0.215 15.41
24 Winn-Dixie Stores Inc. 0.973 16.10 32.12 0.045 -0.095 0.047 0.050 14.44 0.124 14.48
25 Heinz (H J) Co. 0.979 13.49 33.21 0.079 0.240 0.079 0.067 14.95 0.122 14.96
26 Eastman Kodak Co. 0.983 28.28 16.74 0.023 0.021 0.009 -0.014 26.48 0.398 26.82
27 Campbell Soup Co. 0.986 16.33 24.92 0.028 0.003 0.025 0.083 18.82 0.232 18.25
28 Philip Morris Cos Inc. 0.993 12.25 14.71 0.129 0.150 0.130 0.075 10.71 0.173 11.02
29 Southern Co. 0.995 11.26 16.54 0.034 -0.007 0.000 0.012 11.26 0.227 11.20
30 Du Pont (E I) de Nemours 0.996 14.16 14.55 0.099 0.131 0.001 0.078 18.04 0.588 17.28
31 Phelps Dodge Corp. 1.008 11.47 15.51 0.186 -0.358 -0.011 -0.010 7.31 1.065 7.43
32 Pfizer Inc. 1.019 17.63 42.36 0.052 0.155 0.062 0.132 23.41 0.114 22.44
33 Hershey Foods Corp. 1.022 14.66 26.13 0.025 0.045 0.058 0.082 15.93 0.257 15.72
34 Ingersoll-Rand Co. 1.024 14.24 15.19 0.045 0.144 -0.018 0.041 18.25 0.426 17.61
35 FPL Group Inc. 1.048 11.86 16.01 0.038 0.042 0.019 0.025 12.12 0.273 12.08
36 Pitney Bowes Inc. 1.064 16.11 20.30 0.049 0.117 0.086 0.117 18.62 0.356 18.26
37 Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. 1.073 14.43 28.29 0.073 -0.116 -0.011 0.037 14.10 0.468 13.82
38 Rockwell Intl Corp. 1.075 9.42 17.36 0.062 -0.042 0.020 -0.019 7.74 0.271 7.94
39 Dow Chemical 1.081 15.25 15.60 0.042 -0.006 0.026 0.015 14.20 0.763 14.31
40 General Electric Co. 1.091 15.16 35.92 0.051 0.122 0.015 0.143 23.08 0.178 21.46
41 Abbott Laboratories 1.097 17.58 24.08 0.114 0.109 0.098 0.107 17.96 0.091 17.87
42 Merck & Co. 1.122 23.29 27.68 0.066 0.155 0.072 0.124 29.02 0.228 28.12
43 Penney (J C) Co. 1.133 13.14 21.31 0.094 -0.354 -0.003 0.006 9.25 0.301 9.34
44 Union Pacific Corp. 1.136 12.99 14.84 0.010 -0.117 0.021 -0.019 10.44 0.252 10.72
45 Schering-Plough 1.137 18.18 31.54 0.112 0.183 0.060 0.125 23.15 0.145 22.28
46 Pepsico Inc. 1.147 18.94 30.28 0.082 0.022 0.046 0.038 17.62 0.147 17.73
47 McGraw-Hill Companies 1.150 16.93 28.19 0.051 0.136 0.052 0.074 19.29 0.314 19.01
48 Household International Inc 1.184 8.36 17.37 0.019 0.209 0.008 0.093 12.46 0.356 11.81
49 Emerson Electric Co. 1.196 17.52 21.61 0.047 0.087 0.044 0.080 20.01 0.106 19.59
50 General Motors Corp. 1.206 11.21 7.77 0.052 -0.175 -0.023 -0.012 9.55 1.554 9.57
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53 Colgate-Palmolive Co. 1.213 16.60 33.05 0.067 0.138 0.025 0.048 18.78 0.322 18.50
52 Eaton Corp. 1.216 10.64 14.46 0.137 -0.095 0.001 0.011 9.00 0.696 9.02
53 Dana Corp. 1.222 10.26 10.84 0.069 -0.057 -0.011 0.068 11.54 0.604 11.09
54 Sears Roebuck & Co. 1.256 12.41 14.74 0.030 -0.047 -0.014 -0.019 11.45 0.273 11.52
55 Corning Inc. 1.258 19.33 26.32 0.052 0.165 -0.013 -0.019 20.92 0.448 20.90
56 General Dynamics Corp. 1.285 9.06 17.25 0.056 0.131 -0.023 0.063 12.27 1.173 11.68
57 Coca-Cola Co. 1.290 21.68 46.85 0.085 -0.121 0.055 0.058 18.41 0.128 18.51
58 Boeing Co. 1.306 11.93 28.13 0.169 -0.042 0.017 -0.012 9.21 0.961 9.42
59 Ford Motor Co. 1.308 8.62 8.67 0.016 0.019 0.026 0.078 9.97 1.466 9.69
60 Peoples Energy Corp. 1.454 9.58 14.01 0.000 -0.069 0.005 0.002 8.98 0.136 9.01
61 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 1.464 12.02 18.22 0.022 0.355 0.012 0.040 17.18 0.538 16.73
62 May Department Stores Co. 1.525 11.32 15.74 0.050 0.077 0.006 0.023 12.15 0.233 12.03
63 ITT Industries Inc. 1.630 9.92 12.87 0.038 -0.016 0.018 -0.019 8.53 0.394 8.73
64 Raytheon Co. 1.821 11.75 22.14 0.112 -0.328 0.050 -0.014 6.79 0.230 7.14
65 Cooper Industries Inc. 1.857 12.41 12.75 0.108 0.100 0.037 -0.014 10.69 0.512 10.99




= estimates ofβ from Section 3 (1958–1994 estimation period).
PEa
i
= median PE ratio 1957–1994.
PEb
i
= median PE ratio 1996–2000.
ea
i
= median earnings growth rate 1958–1994.
eb
i
= median earnings growth rate 1996–2000.
da
i
= median dividend growth rate 1958–1994.
db
i
= median dividend growth rate 1996–2000.
P̂E
b1
i = predicted median PE ratio 1996–2000 from equation (3) in Table 3. [= exp( ̂logPEb1i )]
σa
i
= estimate of the variability of the earnings growth rate 1958–1994.
P̂E
b2
i = predicted median PE ratio 1996–2000 from equation (4) in Table 3. [= exp( ̂logPEb2i )]
8
For each companyi annual data were collected for 1957–2000 on its stock
price at the end of the year (P it ), its earnings per share for the year (E
i
t ), and its
dividends per share for the year (Dit ). Adjustments were made for stock splits.
The data were obtained from the CRSP/COMPUSAT Merged Database from the
website of Wharton Research Data Services.
One company, International Paper Company (IP), was not used even though
data existed for all the years. Earnings of IP for all five years between 1996 and
2000 are very low, and the median PE ratio is 127.5 for this period. This is not
a sensible number, and if this observation were used for the empirical work in
Section 5 it would be a huge outlier. Rather than try to adjust the PE ratio down in
some way, the IP company was just not used.
3 Estimates of Risk
The β Regressions
As noted in the Introduction, two measures of risk are computed per company. The
first is β from the CAPM model. LetP mt denote the value of the S&P 500 stock
price index at the end of yeart , and letDmt denote S&P 500 dividends for year
t . The market rate of return,Rmt , that is used for theβ regressions is taken to be
(P mt + Dmt )/P mt−1. The risk free rate,Rft , is taken to be the one-year Treasury bill
rate (average for the year).5
5Because of data limitations, the six-month rate is used for 1958 (average for the year). The
data were obtained from the web site of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The bill rates are for the secondary market.
9
The rate of return for companyi, Rit , is taken to be(P
i
t + Dit )/P it−1, where
P it andD
i
t are defined in Section 2. Observations onR
i
t are available beginning in
1958 for all but three companies, where the beginning year is 1960 for Aetna and
1963 for Household International and Union Pacific. For each of the 65 companies
the following regression was run for the period beginning in 1958 (or later for the
three) and ending in 1994:
Rit − Rft = β(Rmt − Rft ) + εt , t = 1958, . . . , 1994
The 65 estimates ofβ, denotedβai , are presented in Table 1, where the com-
panies are ranked by the size of the estimates. The estimated standard error ofβai ,
denotedSEβi , is also presented. The remaining four columns in Table 1 include
the results of various tests of theβ regressions. The first test is to add a constant
term to each regression. The CAPM model does not call for a constant term in the
regression, and so testing the hypothesis that the constant term is zero is one test of
the model. The t-statistic for the constant term estimate, denotedtαi , is presented
in the table for each of the 65 regressions. In only 7 of the 65 cases is the t-statistic
greater than 2.0 in absolute value, and so the hypothesis of a zero constant term is
generally not rejected.
The last three tests are stability tests. The first hypothesis tested is that there
is no structural break in the equation between 1974 and 1977. The test due to
Andrews and Ploberger (AP) (1994) was used. This test has the advantage that a
single break point does not have to be specified, only a range of possible break
points. Each regression has 37 observations, and the 5 percent critical value for
10
the AP statistic for this number of observations and one coefficient is 2.00.6 In
Table 1 only 7 of the 65 values ofAPi are greater than 2.00, and so the stability
hypothesis is generally not rejected.
The next test is of the hypothesis that there is no structural break near the end
of the sample period—in 1990. The test due to Andrews (2002) was used. The
p-values from this test are presented in the table. Only 9 of the 65 p-values are less
than .05, and so the end-of-sample stability hypothesis is generally not rejected.
The final test is of the hypothesis that there is no structural break near the
beginning of the sample period—in 1963.7 The Andrews (2002) test was also used
for this purpose. The p-values from this test are presented in the table. Again,
only 9 of the 65 p-values are less than .05, and so the beginning-of-sample stability
hypothesis is generally not rejected.
The overall results are thus fairly supportive of the CAPM model for this set
of companies. The regressions are mostly stable, and most of the estimates of
the constant term are not significant. On the negative side, most of the estimates
of β are not significantly different from 1.0, which means that there is not much
precision in the ranking of theβ estimates. It will be seen in Section 5, however,
that there is some evidence that the estimates ofβ are picking up risk differences
across companies.
6See Andrews and Ploberger (1994), Table I.




Another measure of the risk of a company, not consistent with the CAPM model, is
the variation of its earnings. Maybe the average investor looks only at a company’s
earnings fluctuations in judging how risky it is? The measure that was used is as
follows. In the next section the growth rates of each company’s real earnings
are computed for 1958–1994.8 These growth rates are ranked, and the median,
denotedeai , is computed. The variation in the growth rate of earnings, denoted
σai , is then taken from this ranking to be the difference between the value above
which 20 percent of the growth rates lie and the value below which 20 percent of
the growth rates lie. This range was used as the measure of variation because it is
not sensible to compute variances in the usual way due to extreme values at both
ends of the ranking. The values ofσai are presented in the second-to-last column
of Table 2.
4 Computing PE Ratios, Earnings Growth, and
Dividend Growth
Computing average PE ratios is problematic because earnings can be very small or
negative. For the present calculations the PE ratio for a given year was taken to be
large (and positive) if earnings for the year were negative. The ratio was taken to
be large enough to put the observation at the top when the observations are ranked.
The average PE ratio was then taken to be the median of the ranked observations.
This way of treating negative earnings affects the calculation of the average value
8In some cases the first year was later than 1958.
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only in that the large values are put at the top before the median is taken.
For each company the median was computed for the 1957–1994 period. For
a few companies the earnings data began after 1957, and for these companies the
median was computed for the period consisting of the first available observation
through 1994. The median for companyi for this period will be denotedPEai ,
wherea denotes the 1957–1994 (or slightly shorter) period.
The median for each company was also computed for the 1996–2000 period,
which meant ranking the five yearly observations and taking the third one. For one
company, Corning, three of the five PE ratios were very large because of very low
earnings, and for Corning the average PE ratio was taken to be the second lowest
rather than the third. The median for companyi for this period will be denoted






The last row in Table 2 presents the mean of the 65 observations for each
variable. The mean ofPEai is 14.21, and the mean ofPE
b
i is 20.99. There has
thus been on average a large increase in the median PE ratio from before to after
1995 for these companies, which is consistent with the S&P 500 data discussed in
Section 1.
Four other variables per company were also computed: the median growth
rates of earnings for the two periods, denotedeai ande
b
i , and the median growth
rates of dividends for the two periods, denoteddei andd
b
i . Earnings and dividends
from Section 2 were first deflated by the GDP deflator:ERit = Eit /GDPDt and
DRit = Dit /GDPDt , whereGDPDt is the GDP deflator for yeart , ER denotes
real earnings, andDR denotes real dividends. The growth rate of real earnings was
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then computed as(ERit −ERit−1)/ERit−1 whenERit−1 was positive. WhenERit−1
was zero or negative, the growth rate was taken to be a large positive number if
ERit > ER
i
t−1 and a large negative number ifERit < ERit−1. For each period the
growth rates were ranked and the median of the ranked observations was taken.9
(As discussed in the previous section, these growth rates of real earnings for 1958–
1994 were used to computeσai , the variability measure.) The same procedure was
followed for dividends, where there are zero values for a few of theDit but no
negative values. Again, medians were computed for the period up to 1994 and for
the period 1996–2000. The four median growth rates per company are presented
in Table 2.
It can be seen from the last row in Table 2 that on average earnings growth was
less after 1995 (mean of .044 versus .056) and dividend growth was greater (mean
of .040 versus .023).
5 The Cross Company Regressions
1957–1994 Period
If 1957–1994 was a period in which there were no large shifts in the risk charac-
teristics of the 65 companies, then the estimates ofβai or σ
a
i may be reasonable
approximations of the riskiness of the companies. One would expect, other things
being equal, for more risky companies to have on average lower PE ratios. If,
9For the second period, which consists of only five observations, this procedure did not result in
sensible growth rates for five companies (Boeing, Goodyear, Halliburton, ITT, and Phillips). For
each of these five companies total real earnings were computed for 1990–1994 and 1996–2000,




i is a good measure of risk, it should have a negative effect
on PEai . One would also expect companies with higher average growth rates of
earnings and dividends to have higher average PE ratios, so thateai andd
a
i should
have positive effects onPEai .





dai for the 65 company observations. This regression is equation (1) in Table 3.
The coefficient estimate forβai is negative, as expected, and it has a t-statistic
of −1.99, which is significant at the 5 percent level for a one-tailed test. The
coefficient estimates for the two growth rates are positive, as expected, although
the estimate for earnings growth only has a t-statistic of 1.46. The significance of
βai thus provides further support for the CAPM model for this set of companies.
The results provide some evidence that the estimates ofβ are picking up risk
differences across companies. If the estimates were not, they should not have a
negative effect on the average PE ratios.
Regarding the other possible measure of risk,σai , logPE
a
i was regressed on




i for the 65 company observations. This regression is
equation (2) in Table 3. The coefficient estimate forσai is of the expected negative
sign, but it only has a t-statistic of−1.01. From this regression there is not much
support forσai being a good measure of risk.
1996–2000 Period
Equation (1) in Table 3 can be used to predict what the average PE ratio of a
company should be in the 1996–2000 period if there were no structural breaks.




Dependent Variable is logPEai
Explanatory Variables








(1) 2.74 -.218 .839 2.802 .229 .232
(22.79) (-1.99) (1.46) (3.33)
(2) 2.56 .805 2.254 -.073 .234 .195
(41.44) (1.36) (2.26) (-1.01)
(3) ̂logPEb1i = 2.74− .218βai + .839ebi + 2.802dbi + ν̂a1i
(4) ̂logPEb2i = 2.56− .073σai + .805ebi + 2.254dbi + ν̂a2i
Notes:
t-statistics are in parentheses.
# obs. = 65.
ν̂a1i = estimated error in equation (1) for companyi.
ν̂a2i = estimated error in equation (2) for companyi.
See Table 2 for the other notation.
all the effects on a company’s average PE ratio that are not picked up by itsβ,
growth rate of earnings, and growth rate of dividends. If it is assumed for each
company thatβai andν̂
a1
i have not changed (no structural breaks in this sense), but
that perceived earnings growth and dividend growth have changed (fromeai to e
b
i
and fromdai to d
b
i ), then the prediction of the average PE ratio for 1996–2000 is as
listed in equation (3) in Table 3. This calculation uses the coefficients estimated for
the 1958–1994 period, but the 1996–2000 values of earnings growth and dividend
growth.
The predictions ofPEbi from equation (3) are presented in Table 2, where
P̂E
b1
i = exp( ̂logPEb1i ). It is clear from Table 2 that these predictions, which
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are the predicted average PE ratios for 1996–2000, are close to the actual average
PE ratios for 1957–1994. Becauseβai andν̂
a1
i are used in equation (3), the only
reason logPEai and ̂logPEb1i differ for a given company is because the growth
rates of earnings and dividends differ between the two periods. The net effect of
these differences is in general not large, i.e., logPEai and ̂logPEb1i are in general
close.
Note that theβs have not been reestimated for the predictions:βai is used in
equation (3). It would not have been practical to reestimate theβs because five
observations per company is not enough to get trustworthy estimates. More to
the point, however, as discussed above, the analysis in this paper is based on the
assumption that the risk characteristics of the companies have not changed, i.e.,
that a company’sβ has not changed.
Equation (2) in Table 3 can also be used to predict what the average PE ratio of
a company should be in the 1996–2000 period if there were no structural breaks.
This is done in equation (4), whereν̂a2i is the estimated error in equation (2) for
companyi. This prediction, of course, uses as the measure of riskσai instead of
βai . The predictions ofPE
b
i from equation (4) are also presented in Table 2, where
it is again clear that these predictions are close to the actual average PE ratios for
1957–1994.
The main interest of this paper is to examine the difference between the actual
average PE ratio for 1996–2000 (PEbi ) and the predicted average under the as-




i ). Table 2 shows that on average
this difference is large and positive. Now, if the increase in the average PE ratios
is due to a fall in investors’ risk aversion, more risky companies should have had
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larger increases. (See the appendix for a proof of this for a particular model.)
The tests are presented in Table 4. Row 1 is a regression of logPEbi − ̂logPEb1i
on a constant andβai . If there has been a decrease in risk aversion, the coefficient
estimate ofβai should be positive and significant. The estimate is positive but
not significant, with a t-statistic of 1.18. There is thus little evidence that highβ
companies had on average more of a non predicted increase in their PE ratios than
did low β companies.
The regression in row 1 inTable 4 uses the predictions of logPEbi from equation
(3) in Table 3. Any misspecification in equation (3) will affect the results in row
1 in Table 4. A simpler test, which does not depend on equation (3), is to regress
the actual log change in the average PE ratios, logPEbi − logPEai , on a constant
andβai . From the perspective of equation (3), the assumption is being made that
ebi = eai anddbi = dai . In other words, the assumption is that the perceived growth
rates of earnings and dividends have not changed from 1957–1994 to 1996–2000
(as well asβai andν̂
a1
i not changing). This regression is in row 2 in Table 4, where
the coefficient estimate forβai is still not significant. The main conclusion is thus
not sensitive to whether or not the predictions from equation (3) are used.
The above analysis can be repeated withσai in place ofβ
a
i and ̂logPEb2i in
place of ̂logPEb1i . This is done in rows 3 and 4 of Table 4. The coefficient estimate
of σai in both rows is negative and significant. These results say that if we takeσ
a
i
as measuring risk, the least risky companies have had the largest increase in their
PE ratios. This, of course, is opposite to what would be the case if risk aversion
has fallen. It is unclear, however, how much weight should be put on this result









1 logPEbi − ̂logPEb1i .081 .219 .392 .022
(0.40) (1.18)
2 logPEbi − logPEai .285 .063 .304 .003
(1.82) (0.44)
3 logPEbi − ̂logPEb2i .465 -.293 .352 .134
(7.34) (-3.12)
4 logPEbi − logPEai .461 -.222 .285 .119
(8.97) (-2.92)
Notes:
t-statistics are in parentheses.
# obs. = 65.
See Table 3 for the computation of̂l gPE
b1
i and ̂logPEb2i .
See Table 2 for the other notation.
no support for the hypothesis that risk aversion has fallen.
6 Conclusion
A remarkable feature of the data for the 65 companies is on average the large
increase in the median PE ratio from 1957–1994 to 1996–2000. This increase
is not explained by higher earnings or dividend growth in 1996–2000, since the
predicted PE ratios from equations (3) and (4) in Table 3 are much lower on average
than the actual ratios. (Earnings growth was in fact on average lower in 1996–2000
than earlier, although dividend growth was higher.)
The main point of this paper is to show that larger increases in PE ratios did not
occur for the more risky companies. This is contrary to what one would expect if
19
there were a fall in the degree of risk aversion of the average investor after 1995.
Some other explanation is needed for the large average PE increases.
The results in this paper may have implications for the future growth of stock
prices. Since the degree of risk aversion does not appear to have fallen, the reason
for the large PE increases may be due to something less fundamental and permanent.
If, for example, they have been due to unrealistically large expectations of future
earnings or dividends, the PE increases are less likely to last than if they have been
due to a fall in risk aversion.
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Appendix
Consider a particular company. LetP = price per share,E = earnings per share,
D = dividends per share,g = the growth rate of dividends,r = the risk free rate,γ =
the coefficient of risk aversion,β = the risk of the company, andσ 2 = the variance
of consumption changes.γ , β, andσ 2 are non negative; a decrease inγ is a fall
in risk aversion; and a decrease inβ is a fall in the risk of the company. Following
Cochrane (2001), p. 19, the expected return on the company’s stock isr + βγσ 2.
It is assumed thatr − g > 0 and thus thatr + βγσ 2 − g > 0 sinceβ, γ , andσ 2
are non negative. Ifr is not greater thang, then the PE ratio below is not defined







r + βγσ 2 − g
)
(1)






− log(r + βγσ 2 − g) (2)
Taking the derivative of equation (11) with respect to−γ yields
z = ∂ log(P/E)−∂γ =
βσ 2
r + βγσ 2 − g > 0 (3)





(r + βγσ 2 − g)2 > 0 (4)
Thus whenγ falls, the increase in log(P/E) is larger the larger isβ.
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